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Abstract
We introduce a problem setting which we call “the freedom fighters’ problem”. It subtly
differs from the prisoners’ problem. We propose a steganographic method that allows Alice
and Bob to fool Wendy the warden in this setting. Their messages are hidden in encryption
keys. The recipient has no prior knowledge of these keys, and has to cryptanalyze ciphertexts
in order to recover them. We show an example of the protocol and give a partial security
analysis.
1 Introduction
Usually, the aim of steganography is to send a secret message M hidden in an ordinary data
stream S (the ‘covertext’) in such a way that the adversary does not suspect the presence of M .
This setting was formalized by Simmons in [2], where he introduced the “prisoners’ problem”.
Two prisoners, called Alice and Bob, are located in different cells and wish to devise an escape
plan. They are allowed to exchange written messages. However, Wendy the warden inspects all
messages. If any message looks suspicious she will immediately punish them, ruining all their hopes
of escape. Her suspicion is aroused by e.g. references to escape, unusual phrases and formatting,
or anything resembling encryption.
In this paper we describe a steganographic technique for a somewhat different setting, which
could be called the “freedom fighters’ problem”. The freedom fighters Alice and Bob wish to plan
an event. They communicate over an insecure channel which is eavesdropped on by their powerful
adversary Wendy. The circumstances are as follows.
• Wendy allows Alice and Bob to discuss anything they wish. She never blocks a message.
• Wendy will punish Alice and Bob if she catches them putting their plans into action.
• Alice and Bob know that Wendy will watch them very closely if they use unbreakable1
crypto. Such surveillance will prevent them from realizing their event.
• Alice and Bob know that Wendy is highly adept at steganalysis and cryptanalysis.
The aim of the freedom fighters is to discuss their plan without Wendy learning what the plan
is, and then to put the plan into action. We propose the following solution. Alice encrypts a
covertext with a key that carries the secret mesage M . She intentionally uses a weak cipher that
is relatively easy to break, so that Bob can recover the key by breaking the encryption. Wendy
will of course also break the encryption, but she will focus far more on the covertext than on the
precise value of the employed key. In order not to alert Wendy to the message present in the key,
Alice and Bob use a second cipher to encrypt the hidden message so that the key looks random.
This scheme is different from [3, 1], where messages are hidden in the random input of ran-
domized signatures. Our system is effective because Wendy has no reason to believe that Alice
and Bob are sending ciphertext to each other for which the recipient does not have the decryption
key. Below we present an example of this scheme.
1 This is the main difference with the prisoners’ problem, where any form of crypto is punished.
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2 An example of the protocol
Alice and Bob have a shared secret key K. They have agreed on two symmetric ciphers: A strong
cipher C1 and a second, weak cipher C2. The weak cipher is e.g. a block cipher with a known
weakness such as a too short key, or an impressive-looking but flawed cipher cooked up by Alice
and Bob. C2 works with keys of length ℓ2. Alice wants to send a secret messageM to Bob, hidden
in covertext S. They perform the following steps:
1. Alice encrypts the message M with the shared key K.
κ = E
(1)
K
[M ].
The superscript ‘1’ refers to the cipher C1. She then cuts the ciphertext into n pieces of
length ℓ2 (padding if necessary),
κ = κ1|| · · · ||κn.
2. Alice composes a number of covertext messages Si, i = 1, . . . , n. The length of these mes-
sages is arbitrary. The messages are written in ordinary language, or in some other highly
redundant format.
3. Alice computes the following encryptions, using the weak cipher:
ci = E
(2)
κi
[Si].
Over time she sends these n ciphertexts to Bob.
4. For each i, Bob breaks the encryption, obtaining Si and κi from ci. His ability to do
so is guaranteed by the weakness of the cipher C2 and the fact that Si contains a lot of
redundancy2.
5. Using the shared key K, Bob reconstructs Alice’s message as follows
M = D
(1)
K
[
κ1|| · · · ||κn
]
.
Then Bob sends a reply to Alice in the same way, etc. (Alternatively, Alice and Bob exchange
ciphertexts in an interleaved manner, i.e. Alice sends cAlice1 , then Bob sends c
Bob
1 in response, then
Alice sends cAlice2 etc. This allows for more natural looking covertexts, since communication with
one message at a time looks more natural than n messages in one direction followed by n messages
in the other direction. The exchange of covertexts looks like a normal conversation, with each
covertext containing references to the preceding covertexts. The message M , on the other hand,
can of course be reconstructed only after receiving n covertexts; so in terms of message exchanges
the hidden conversation is n times slower than the cover conversation.)
Of course, Wendy too is capable of breaking the C2 encryption. From the ciphertexts ci she
obtains Si and κi. She will assume that the Si are genuine messages. She has no reason to
assume that Alice is sending encrypted data for which Bob has no decryption key! In contrast, it
is entirely believable to Wendy that they are entrusting their secrets to a weak cipher. There are
many historical examples of people thinking that their home-brewed ciphers are invincible.
Being a good cryptanalyst, Wendy will wonder what kind of key schedule Alice and Bob are
using. She will notice that in general κ1 6= κ2 · · · 6= κn. However, the cipher C1 will prevent
her from finding any regularity, provided that C1 is strong enough. The lack of regularity in the
sequence of keys κ1, · · · , κn will not arouse suspicion in Wendy; Alice and Bob may have set up a
list of one-time keys in the past, or they could be using some key updating schedule.
Alice and Bob make sure that the exchange of covertext messages looks ‘normal’, which in this
case means that it must look like an exchange of highly confidential information, i.e. the kind of
data that would never be sent in plaintext. They may also sometimes refer to a ‘key schedule’ for
2 To aid Bob’s cryptanalysis, Alice may also include pieces of plaintext in Si that are known to Bob beforehand.
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determining the κi keys (of course completely fake), thus convincing Wendy that the κi values are
of no direct importance. A nice property of our scheme is that a convincing-looking covertext can
misdirect Wendy in many ways. Most notably, the covertext may directly contradict the secret
message.
Remark: The bit rate of the hidden channel is rather low: ℓ2 bits of ciphertext per exchanged
message.
3 Security analysis
Of course, publishing about a steganographic scheme gives it away. Once the adversary suspects
that there could be a payload in the encryption keys κi, she will start paying attention to them
and start distrusting Si. The steganalysis is now a matter of
A. detecting if there is anything fishy about the set {κi}, and
B. breaking the C1-encryption.
A thorough analysis of part A is nontrivial, and we will not attempt it in this paper. The fact that
the encryption key varies does not, in itself, automatically raise suspicion. First, Alice and Bob
may simply have agreed on a list of one-time keys. Second, they may be using a protocol involving
session key updates. Several protocols are known in the literature where a session key gets updated,
e.g. using a hash chain, in order to provide backward security. It depends on the circumstances if
Wendy has reasons to disbelieve these possibilities. (Note that this has implications for so-called
‘deniable encryption’.)
The difficulty of part B of the steganalysis directly translates to the difficulty of cryptanalysis.
The message M remains hidden from Wendy if the cipher C1 is strong enough.
Remark: If Wendy succeeds in part A, then, in the freedom fighters’ problem setting, Alice
and Bob have lost, even though M remains safe. They have become suspicious and are put under
surveillance.
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